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In th.e Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

JOHN G. MATIEVITCH,
Appellant,

vs.

Case No. 8281

HERCULES POWDER CO.,
a corporation,
Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This was an action brought as a result of a premature explosion in blasting by the use of caps and dynamite. That prior to
the time of trial the counsel for the defendant moved for summary judgment, which judgment was granted by the District
Court and from which summary judgment (R. 45) the plaintiff
now appeals.
The plaintiff was employed at the time of the explosion
as a powder man by the Utah Portland Cement Company in

3
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their LeGrand quarry in Parley's Canyon in Salt Lake Count,
Utah, (R. 26 and R. 15).
On January 9, 1951, the date of the explosion, the plaintiff
was preparing the charges which broke up the rocks which
had been blasted from the quarry~ by loading powder in the
holes drilled in the rocks (R. 29). The plaintiff had placed
a cap and a stick of dynamite in the hole prepared by the drillers, who had preceeded him, and before he had completed
the process, in fact, just as he put the dynamite in the hole,
which hole was eight to twelve inches deep, the dynamite
being eight inches long, the cap and dynamite blew up (R. 36).
The plaintiff was horribly injured, being blinded in both
eyes, having one arm blown off just below the wrist, one arm
lacerated and cut, and both legs injured.
The plaintiff had worked for the Portland Cement Company in the quarry from 1936 to 1942 (R. 25). He started
working for the Company again in 1949 and was working for
them until the accident occurred (R. 26). The plaintiff had
worked with the powder men from 1936 to 1942 and part of
the time as powder man himself and from July 1949 to
January 9, 1951 had worked as powder man and drilled with
the powder crew (R. 27).
At the time of the explosion, the plaintiff was using caps
and dynamite furnished to the Utah Portland Cement Company by the Hercules Powder Company (R. 1, 11, and 16)
and loaded the particular hole with the cap and dynamite
in exactly the same manner which he had always done and
which, in his many years at the quarry, had been done by all
4
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other powder men (R. 16) and in accordance with instructions
given him by his supervisors and persons training him.
On numerous and sundry occasions representatives of the
Hercules Powder Company had watched the plaintiff and
other powder men load holes in exact! y the same manner as
the hole was loaded on January 9, 1951, and had never disapproved of the method, questioned it, or asked them to change
in any way (R. 16 and R. 36).
The plaintiff prepared the caps himself and opened the
original package containing the dynamite and the powder caps
and they were both in the original packages, still sealed as
they came from the manufacturer. The plaintiff had read all
of the cautions in times past and knew the contents thereof
set forth in the packages of powder and caps as shown at R. 14
and had not on this morning done anything which he was
warned against, but had followed his usual procedure.
At the time the motion for summary judgment was made
the counsel for the plaintiff conceded that there was no direct
evidence as to the composition of the cap and dynamite as
all the evidence was destroyed in the explosion and that it
would be impossible to prove from the powder and cap itself
the negligence or the failure of the defendant to manufacture
the caps and dynamite in a safe and satisfactory manner.
The plaintiff stated that he was relying on indirect evidence and circumstances to prove the negligence of the defendant company and the theory of res ipsa loquitur to support
his position. Two affidavits were filed by powder men other
than the plaintiff (see Rudelick and Harwood affidavits (R. 15 &
5
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20) who had worked in this particular rock quarry, one of them

having been a powder man for many years, .and having been
trained by the government in the proper manner of handling
powder (R. 20) From the affidavits and other evidence it was
clear that the plaintiff had done nothing himself to cause the explosion. Louis Rudelich, as an expert, stated that it was his
opinion that the only possible cause of the explosion of the
dynamite and cap in this particular case would be that the cap
and/or the dynamite was defectively manufactured (R. 22).
In spite of the direct expert opinion evidence the court
held that there had to be direct evidence to show the negligence
of the defendant and granted the summary judgment.
The counsel for the plaintiff stated that other evidence
would be introduced showing the acts of the plaintiff could
not have caused the explosion and evidence to show that caps
or dynamite manufactured in the usual manner and standard
could not be made to explode under the circumstances in this
case.
In considering this case, it should be kept in mind that
the full case of the plaintiff has definitely not been put on
and all of the proof and evidence are certainly not in, but as
. the evidence to be presented was rather indirect, the court
allowed the motion for summary judgment.

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THE FOLLOWING
PARTICULARS:
6

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1. There was a disputed fact as to the negligence of the

defendant which should have been allowed to go to the jury.
2. There was direct expert opinion evidence shown

in the affidavit by qualified witnesses to support the disputed
facts.
3. The facts and contentions of the plaintiff, if true,
created a prima faci case and the court erred by not allowing
the plaintiff to prove it by circumstantial evidence and let
the jury decide the question.
4. That even if the plaintiff could not prove his case by
direct or circumstantial evidence, the case still should be tried
and permitted to go to the jury on the theory of res ipsa loquitur.

ARGUMENT
POINT NO. 1
THERE WAS A DISPUTED FACT AS TO THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE DEFENDANT WHICH SHOULD
HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO GO TO THE JURY.
It is a well known fact and recognized beyond argument
that in all cases where there is a disputed fact that the case
should be permitted to go to the jury for the jury to decide.
In a motion for summary judgment it is the law that all
the evidence, pleadings, and affidavits of the party opposing
the motion for summary judgment should be construed in a
light most favorable to the party so opposing. It would seem
7
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that this had not been done in this particular case or the motion
would have been denied.
In the instant case there was a direct dispute in the alleged
negligence as it was alleged in complaint (R. 1, 2, and 3)
and. denied in the answer (R. 7, 18, and 19) . Inasmuch as
the dispute in the pleadings is clear, it would leave the decision
to be based on the £eight of the evidence which will be discussed further.
The motion for summary judgment was made under
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56, which is
practically an exact take off on the U. S. Rule of Civil Procedure for summary judgments, also numbered Rule 56. A
study of the U. S. Rule supports the contentions of the plaintiff
herein. This is set 1orth in the United States Code Annotated,
Vol. 28, Rule 56, Note 4 and the following: Lincoln Electric
Company vs. Knox (1944) 56 Federal ~upplement 308:
((This rule was never intended to throw on the court
the burden of determining a case involving a delicate
question of the law, complicated and controverted
facts, without an adequate and proper hearing."
It further states in Chemical Foundation vs. Universal Cyclops
( 1942) 2 F.R.D. 283:
((It was not the intention of this rule relating to Summary Judgment that a case should be tried by Affidavit
as a substitute for trial in the usual way in open court
where the right of cross-examination exists.''
Page 14 of the above cited volume states:
CCA summary judgment s~ould never be given until
the facts are clear and undisputed, and if there is any
8
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(emphasis supplied) controversy on a factual question
judgment should be withheld until proof is made."
U.S.C.A. Vol. 28, Rule 56, Note 9, Page 155 states:
(<Under this rule, summary judgment is authorized
only where it affirmatively appears from the pleadings,
depositions, affidavits, and admissions on file that except as to the amount of damages there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the mover is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Citing from the same Rule, Ryan vs. Broderick, 56 Federal
Supplement, 189 ( 1945) states:
nA motion for summary judgment cannot be made a
substitute for a trial either before a court or a jury,
and a plaintiff who states a cause of action which entitle him to a trial by jury is entitled to have his case
tried in that way and cannot be compelled to submit
his evidence in the form of affidavits in resistance to
a motion for summary judgment.''
It would seem very clear from the above citations that the
District Judge had erred in granting the motion for summary
judgment as there is no question as to the dispute in the record
and there is absolutely nothing in the record to show the actual
cause of the explosion, and the jury should be entitled to find
the real cause. The only thing in opposition to the plaintiff's
theory that the defendant was negligent in manufacture was
the very nebulous statement that dynamite is dangerous and
should be handled carefully.
It is still going to have to be decided just exactly what
did happen to cause the accident. The plaintiff's theories and
the defendant's other theories have not been placed in evidence.
<)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

It would seem that the court by its ruling is compelling
or will compel each and every plaintiff to present all of his evidence in the form of depositions or affidavits so that everything
could be examined before the trial, contrary to · the general
intent and interpretation of Rule 56, and that the trial court
has passed judgment prematurely. This is supported by Begnaud
vs. White (1948) 170 F. 2d 323:
((The Trial Judge should be slow in passing upon the
motion for Summry Judgment which would deprive
party of right to trial by jury where the material fact
is disputed."
To allow the ruling to stand in the present case would
practically do away with trials except in cases where there is
actual direct evidence of eye witnesses.

POINT NO. II
THERE WAS DIRECT OPINION EVIDENCE
SHOWN IN THE AFFIDAVIT BY QUALIFIED WITNESSES TO SUPPORT THE DISPUTED FACT.
The court erred in ignoring the opinion evidence of Louis
Rudelich, who was qualified as an expert as shown by his affidavit. Instead of assuming that the explosion was the result
of a defective cap or dynamite as the court was bound to do
in considering the motion, the court entirely ignored the opinion
evidence of Louis Rudelich, who seems to have been the most
qualified of any person shown in the record to say what caused
the accident. The direct conclusion of Mr. Rudelich is that
10
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the explosion could not have been caused by anything except
defective materials furnished by the defendant (R. 22).
It is such a well established fact under the law that experts
are allowed to express their opinion even though they cannot
testify directly as to the actual occurrence, that it would seem to
be specious to argue the point. However, it seems to have been
ignored in this instance. From the record in a number of powder
cases which have been reported, opinion evidence was used
in similar situations where the actual evidence was just as nebulous and indirect as it is in the present case.
This was true in th ecase of Morris vs. E. I. Dupont Ne
Mours, ( 193 7) 109 S. W. 1222, and Hopkins vs. E. I. Dupant
Ne Mours, ( 1952) 199 Fed. 2d 930. In this latter case,
opinion evidence of an expert was clearly allowed both for the
plaintiff and the defendant, and the court, from its opinion,
very clearly recognized the expert opinion of a man trained
by practical experience over the years, such as is the case with
Mr. Rudelich. This case will be cited further.
From the above it would seem clear that without any
further evidence, except the statement of Mr. Rudelich, this
motion should have been denied.

POINT III
THAT THE FACTS AND CONTENTIONS OF THE
PLAINTIFF, IF TRUE, CREATED A PRIMA FACI CASE
AND THE COURT ERRED BY NOT ALLOWING THE
PLAINTIFF TO PROVE IT BY CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND THE JURY DECIDE THE QUESTION.
11
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The court erred in not allowing the plaintiff to prove his
contentions by the use of circumstantial evidence. With respect
to circumstantial evidence as proof of a fact, attention is called
to Volume 20, Am. Jur., Section 271:
ccThe competency of circumstantial evidence is not
open to question, provided it is the best evidence which
the nature of the case admits, or its use is not prevented
by a binding contractual provision which excludes use
of circumstantial evidence arises either from the nature
of the inquiry or the failure of direct proof, considerable latitude is allowed in the reception of circumstantial evidence. No evidence should be excluded of any
fact or circumstance connected with the principal trans- action in dispute from which an inference as to the
truth of irrelevancy are not favored for the reason that
the force and effect of circumstantial facts usually and
almost necessarily depend upon ·their connection with
each other. However, a fact is admissible as a basis
of an inference only where the desired inference is
of an interference only where the desired inference is
a probable or natural explanation of the fact and a more
probable and natural one than other explanations, if
any.
The attorney for the plaintiff calls attention to the case
of Park vs. Moorman Manufacturing Company (1952) 241
Pac. 2nd, 914, which was tried by this attorney. That was
a case of chickens dying from use of feed, and in that case there
was absolutely no direct evidence to show that the manufacturer was negligent in the manufacturing of the feed, and
it was admitted that the feed which was purported to have
caused the death had no deleterious or poisonous substances
and was constituted exactly as represented by the manufacturer,
and that the feed in and of itself could not kill the chickens.

12
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During the course of the trial, there were many other reasons
shown why the death of the chickens involved could have
been the result of numerous and sundry other factors and illnesses rather than the feed in question. However, it was submitted to the jury and even though there was no direct evidence, judgment was obtained and was unanimously upheld
by the Utah Supreme Court in 1952. The case is being reported
and annotated in the A. L. R., second series.
With respect to circumstantial evidence and its proof it
comes very close to involving the theory of res ipsa loquitur,
as res ipsa liquitur is based somewhat on circumstances and
inferences.
However, the Pennsylvania case of Hopkins vs. E. I.
Dupont Ne Mours, .199 Fed. 2d 930, was based strictly on
circumstantial evidence, and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
was not considered, as the court of Pennsylvania has previously
held that res ipsa loquitur does' not apply in explosion cases.
In this case, the plaintiff's husband was drilling bore holes
about six feet deep which were to be filled with dynamite,
and at the time of the filling, another drill was operating
within five feet of the hole. Defendant's expert testified that
the explosion was caused by heat and/ or vibration from the
drilling in the adjacent hole. The court cited Maize vs. Atlantic
Refining Co., 352 Pa. 51, stating that the Maize case stands
for the proposition that one who supplies an instrumentality
for the use by others and who knows or should know that the
foreseeable ·use is dangerous for human life unless certain
precautions are taken and who realize or should realize that

13
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the probable user will not recognize the danger is under a duty
to warn of such danger and to advise the proper precautions.
Quoting the Hopkins vs. N e Mours case, the court stated,
the defendants
attempted to pary the thrust of the Maize case
by saying it is inapplicable here. Defendant tells us
that everybody knows that dynamite is dangerous and
there is no need to warn against the obvious, but the
plaintiff's theory does not go to the generally dangerous
character of the dynamite."
cc

•

•

•

Says everyone should know that dynamite should not be
thrown in the fire, but construction workers don't know that
heat or vibration of drilling will cause an explosion and should
be warned of the danger. The case further shows that the
defendant was warned by publishing the safety list of 63
ndo'n'ts" (apparently the same 63 ((don'ts" as shown in the
affidavit of L. W. Early, R. 13) and that item No. 21 warns
against loading the final charge in a sprung hole until it is
cooled off. The court said, however, there was no warning
about the new hole. The defendant claimed there was no
competent proof by the plaintiff as to the actual happening
and no proof of negligence from the mere happening of the
event, but the court stated:
tCPROOF TO A DEGREE OF MATHEMATICAL
PRECISION IS NOT REQUIRED." (Emphasis supplied.)
And ·it further states:
tCThat it is not the rule that circumstantial evidence
need exclude everything which the ingenuity of counsel
may suggest as having caused or contributed to death.''
14
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In the Hopkins vs. Ne Mours case, the lower court had
found in favor of the defendant, based on lack of direct evidence, but the Federal Court reversed it and found for the
plaintiff.
In the .Nforris vs. E. I. Dupont Ne Mours (previously
cited) the drill holes were in clay and the holes were four
feet deep and were loaded by pushing the dynamite and cap
in with the tamping stick and there was a prematu~e explosion.
In the trial of this case, the judgment was given to the
defendant, based on what was later admitted to be erroneous
instructions to the jury. However, in arguing the case, to the
Appellate Court, the defendant contended that it did not make
any difference whether or not the instructions were erroneous,
~
as the plaintiff had not made out a submissible case, and consequently the correctness or incorrectness of the instructions
would have no bearing on the liability of the defendant. The
Court agreed that the plaintiff would have no claim if a submissible case had not been made. The defendant further contended that the cause of the premature explosion was strictly
a matter of circumstantial evidence and conjecture (emphasis
supplied) and that there was no direct evidence to show the
real cause of the explosion. The Court held that there was circumstantial evidence and that a number of inferences might
be drawn as to the cause of the explosion but that even though
several inferences might be drawn, the plaintiff had made out
a submissible case and the inferences could be concentrated
(emphasis supplied) and become basis for final liability. The
case was reversed and remanded.
From the foregoing cases and the rules set forth therein,

15
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it would seem clear that the plaintiff should be allowed to
show all of the surrounding circumstances and facts concerning the actual explosion and the defendant be allowed to show
any· circumstances or theory which they have which might explain the explosion and then permit the jury to determine the
actual cause of the accident.
To refuse to permit the jury to determine these facts was
error and the motion for summary judgment should have been
denied.

POINT NO. IV
THAT EVEN IF ·THE PLAINTIFF COULD NOT
PROVE HIS CASE BY DIRECT OR CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE, THE CASE SHOULD BE TRIED AND PERMITTED TO GO TO THE JURY ON THE THE.ORY OF
RES IPSA LOQUITUR.
The theory of res ipsa loquitur-meaning the thing speaks
for itself-has been applied in numerous explosion cases similar in nature to the case at hand and should have been applied
in this case. If res ipsa loquitur is allowed in this case, the
plaintiff would only be required to show that he was free from
negligence in the handling of the caps and dynamite. After it
was shown that he was free from negligence, the jury could
infer that there had been negligence on the part of the manufacturer from the fact of the explosion itself.
In the early application of the doctrine, a number of jurisdictions established the theory that the defendant, at the time
of the accident had to have an actual physical control of the
16
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object which caused the injury. These cases are practically
universally outmoded in the present tr~nd, which will be seen
from the cases cited and the rules set forth therein. It is now
almost universally recognized that if the manufacturer, the
defendant, was negligent even though the particular item
which caused the injury passed through many hands if the
item was not changed but remained in the same state as when
it left the control of the manufacturer and the plaintiff does
nothing to contribute to the accident, then the theory of res
ipsa loquitur applies.
Utah recognizes the res ipsa loquitur theory as is clearly
shown in the cases decided by the Supreme Court. The defendant relied on the case of Jordan vs. Coca Cola Bottling
Company, (Utah 1950) 218 Pac. 2d 660, to support its position. In thise case the injury arose from the alleged swallowing
of a fly in a bottle of Coca Cola which was served out of a
dispensing machine in Magna. The court very clearly recognized the theory of res ipsa loquitur and set forth the responsibility of the manufacturer to third persons who were injured
by their products. The court stated that there were four classes
of packaged items, the first being where the packaged articles
pass directly from the manufacturer to the consumer, and
the second classification being where the package or bottle
comes to the consumer so sealed as food and drink in cans,
or otherwise so constructed that its contents reached the consumer without possibility of change by intermediate parties.
The court stated:
((In both cases the facts clearly justify the application
of the res ispa liquitur doctrine, that the thing speaks
for itself."
17
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The Court very clearly recognized that the instrumentality
causing the injury did not need to be in the actual physical
control of the defendant. The Court classified the instrumentalities into four classes, one of which was a manufactured
product which was in the original package and there was no
opportunity for interference with the product before the ultimate consumption by the injured person. Then the instant
case of the Coca Cola bottle, where the evidence showed there
was a very strong and likely possibility of interference \Vith
the product between the time of the manufacture and the time
of the actual consumption.
In this particular care, the Court stated that the evidence
showed almost overwhelmingly that a fly could not leave
the manufacturing plant of the defendant in the bottle after
the inspection was made. There was also evidence that the cork
on the bottle could be removed and a fly placed in the bottle
without detection. Based on this evidence, the Court stated
that there was not enough inference of negligence to allow
the theory of res ipsa loquitur to apply.
This was a 3-2 decision and the dissenting optnton set
forth that it was straining probability too far to state that
a fly had been put in after the bottle had left the plant as set
forth by the rna jority.
Applying these doctrines to the case at bar, the evidence
will show that the powder and the caps were both in the
original package and were opened at the time the charges
were made and used the same day, and that there was no opportunity for tampering in the mean time. Hence, it would
18
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come under the theory that it was in the original package
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
The Utah Supreme Court also recognized the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur in the case of Stevens, Salt Lake City Incorporated vs. Wong, 259 Pac. 2d, 586. That was a suit to recover
for the injury caused by a leaking water pipe. The plaintiff
applied the theory of res ipsa loquitur for a leaking water pipe
which had been placed in the building 12 years previously,
which according to common knowledge, should have lasted
the life of the building, but did not and caused a leak and
damage. The cause was submitted to the jury on the theory
of res ipsa loquitur and the jury found no cause of action. The
plaintiff appealed on the ground that the plaintiff was entitled
to a judgment, as a matter of law, based on the theory of res
ipsa loquitur that without satisfactory explanation there was
negligence.
The Supreme Court held that res ipsa loquitur allows
the fact finder to infer negligence from the happening of the
event and in the absence of explanation might, in some instances, compel the finding of negligence, but stated that the
plaintiff was not entitled to judgment as matter of law from
the mere happening of the event. The concurring opinion said
that the circumstantial evidence of the negligence might be
highly pursuasive and impelling but did not feel that the Court
should go so far as to say that in any case the fact finder
should be compelled to find negligence.
There have been a number of explosion cases in which
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine was applied. Typical are explosions of bottled soda water, explosions of Pur ex cleaning
19
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fluid, explosions of liquid preparations by paint companies,
powder explosion cases, and even tire explosion cases.
Probably one of the leading explosion cases setting forth
the doctrine in a very full and complete manner is the case
of Baker vs. Goodrich (Cal. 195 ;) 252 Pac. 2d 24. In this
case, a tire exploded after it had been placed on a rim by an
employee of B. F. Goodrich. This case was originally decided
in favor of the defendant, but was reversed on appeal. The
Court set forth three standards for testing the theory of res
ipsa loquitur:
n

1. The accident must be the kind that ordinarily does

not occur in the absence of someone' s negligence.
2. It must not have been due to any voluntary action

or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.
3. It must be caused by an agency or instrumentality
within the exclusive control of the defendant."
Applying these theories to the present case, we find that
the explosion was definitely premature and could not have
happened unless someone was negligent, nor the kind that
ordinarily happens in the absence of someone's negligence
(R. 16 & 39). The question of fact to be determined is as to
whose negligence was the cause?
With respect to the second item, there is no question that
the instrumentality, the cap and the dynamite, was out of
the physical control of the defendant at the time of the explosion, so we must examine the cases to see whether or not this
precludes recovery as contended by the defendants in this case.
The Court, in Baker vs. B. F. Goodrich, states:
20
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'(The requirement that the instrumentality in question must have been within the exclusive control of
the defendant before the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
is applicable does not require proof of such control
by defendant at the time of the accident, but control
at the time of the negligent act is sufficient under certain circumstances." (Emphasis supplied.)
The court further stated that whether or not the manufacturer's evidence was sufficient to rebut the inference of
negligence arising from the application of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur was for the jury and the District Court would
not undertake such a determination.
In this case the Court quoted from Escola vs. Coca
Cola Bottling Company, (Cal. 1944) 150 Pac. 2d. In
the Escola case, a bottle of Coca Cola blew up in a
woman's hand, severe!y cutting her. She proved that
there was no negligence on her part in handling the
bottle and rested after announcing to the court that being
unable to show any specific acts of negligence she relied completely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
The court stated:
((Many authorities state that the happening of the
accident does not speak for itself where it took place
some time after defendant had relinquished control of
the instrumentality causing the injury. Under the more
logical view, (emphasis supplied) however, the doctrine may be applied on the theory that the defendant
had control at the time of the alleged negligent act
although not at the time of the accident (emphasis
supplied), provided plaintiff first proves the condition
of the instrumentality had not been changed after it
left the defendant's possession."

21
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In suits for explosion of bottled soda water the application of res ipsa loquitur theory seems to be invoked by
such a weight of authority as to be almost universal in application.
In the Baker vs. Goodrich case, the court also cited article
({Res Ipsa Loquitur in California," 37 California Law Review,
183 and 201, as follows:
((The plaintiff's mere possession of chattel which
injures him does not prevent a res ipsa loquitur case
where it is made clear that he had done nothing abnormal and has used the thing only for the purposes
for which it was intended. The plaintiff need only
tell enough of what he did and how the accident happened to permit the conclusion that the fault was not
his. Again, he has the burden of proof by a mere preponderance of the evidence and even though the question of his own contribution is left in doubt, res ipsa
loquitur may still be applied under the instruction
to the jury.''
The Court also quoted from the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of the Boston & Maine Railroad
Company vs. Jesionowski, 329 U. S. 452:
((We cannot agree, that res ipsa loquitur thus applied, would bar juries from drawing an inference
of negligence on account of unusual accidents in all
operations where the injured person had himself participated in the operation, even though it was proved
that his operations of the things under his control did
not cause the accident. This viewpoint unduly restricts
the power of the Jury, and in this case, the Jury's right
to draw inference from the evidence to support a verdict and the sufficiency of that evidence to support a
verdict. A conceptualistic doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
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has never been used by this Court to reduce the Jury's
power to draw inferences from the facts. Such an interpretation unduly narrows the doctrine as this Court
applies it."
In the Zentz vs. Coca Cola Bottling Company, 247 Pac.
2d 344, res ipsa loquitur was permitted. This was a case of injury received from ,an exploding bottle of Coca Cola where
the plaintiff obtained a judgment below and it was affirmed
and was based on the explosion of a bottle of Coca Cola and
consequent injury. The Court stated:
((The fact that the accident occurred some time after
the defendant relinquished control of the instrumentality which caused the accident does not preclude the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, provided there is evidence
that the instrumentality has not been improperly
handled by the plaintiff or some third person, or its condition otherwise changed, after control was relinquished
by the defendant; but it must appear that the defendant
had sufficient control or connection with the accident
that it can be said that he was more probably than not
the person responsible for the plaintiff's in jury.
((A person may properly rely upon the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur even though he has participated in
events leading to the accident if the evidence excludes
him as a responsible cause."
In the case of Saprito vs. Purex (Cal. 1953) 255 Pac.
2d 7, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applied. This was
a case of an exploding bottle of pur ex cleaner, an in jury
being sustained from the explosion. In this case, the bottle had
a special pressure release and a special warning to keep in a
cool place, but the court upheld that the evidence that the
bottle was not damaged or had been mistreated, permitted
23
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the invoking of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and stated
the fact of the mere explosion under the circumstances was
sufficient to support the judgment of negligence.
The plaintiff also calls attention to the Hopkins vs. E. I.
Dupont Ne Mours case (previously cited) which was upheld
purely on the basis of circumstantial evidence. However, the
separate opinion of the concurring judge was that they might
just as well have gone off on the theory of res ipsa loquitur.
With further respect to the control of the instrumentality,
the Court in an Oregon case in 1950 of Gore vs. Multnomah
Hotel, 224 Pac. 2d 55 2, set forth the proposition that under
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff's mere possession
of a chattel injuring him does not prevent a res ipsa loquitur
case where it is clear that he has done nothing abnormal and
has used the thing only for the purpose for which it was
intended.
In the argument 1n the District Court, the counsel for
the defendant argued that the manufacturer should not be
liable for items which have left its control and traveled
through so many different hands. This, of course, has already
been shown not to excuse the manufacturer. However, the
manufacturer is specifically shown to have responsibility to
third persons. This is set forth in the American Law Institute
Restatement of Torts, Volume 2, Section 392-398, covers the
responsibility of a manutfacturer to third persons, calling
attention to Section 392, Page 1064, states:
Chattel Dangerous For Intended Use
nOne who supplies another directly or through a
third person, a chattle to be used for the supplier's
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business purposes is subject to liability to those for
whose use the chattel is supplied for bodily harm
caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for
which and by persons for whose use the chattel is
supplied
a. if the supplier has failed to exercise reasonable
care to make the chattel safe for which it is supplied, or
b. the supplier fails to give to those whom he
should expect to use the chattel the information required and the accident is due to the
failure to exercise reasonable care to discover
its dangerous character or condition."
Also Section 395, Page 107;,:
Negligent Manufacture
t(A manufacturer who fails to exercise reasonable
care in the manufacture or chattel, which unless carefully made he should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk causing substantial bodily harm to those
who use it for the purpose for which it was manufactured and to those whom the supplier should expect
to be in the vicinity of its probable use, is subject to
liability for bodily harm caused to them by its lawful
use in a manner and for a purpose for which it was
manufactured." (See also 1074 and 1075).
From this it is seen that the manufacturer is definitely
liable to third persons who use the manufactured article and
the more dangerous the article is likely to be in its ultimate
use, the more care is required in the manufacture of the article,
and contrary to the argument of counsel for defendant, those
who handle the article do not assume the risk of any negligence
of the manufacturer. The only assumption of risk in a dangerous

25

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

occupation is the assumption of normal hazards and not for
any negligent manufacture or defective equipment, but only
those risks which are inherent at all times.
This theory is supported by Flint Explosion Company vs.
Edwards, 66 S. E. 2d 368. This is a case of premature explosion
of dynamite in the lighting of a fuse. In this case, it was sent
back for a re-trial because the complaint was duplicitous in
that plaintiff was pleading both ordinary negligence and wanton negligence. However, the Court said in that case:
UA manufacturer or seller of an article which is inherently and imminently dangerous to life, to health
or becomes dangerous thereto when applied to its
intended use in the usual and customary manner is
liable to the buyer or third persons for injuries sustained without his fault as a natural and proximate
result of negligence in the manufacture.

What constitutes due care by a manufacturer or
dealer in manufacture or sale of articles which are inherently dangerous to human life or become dangerous
thereto when applied to their intended use in the usual
and customary manner varies with the danger inherent
therein and a greater measure of care is necessary in
dealing with explosives than ordinary products.
In an action against the manufacturer or seller of
dynamite and caps and allegedly defective fuse, for
injuries to the buyer as a result of premature explosion,
said defendants exercised due care, whether the manufacturer exercised measure of care adopted by explosives industry generally and fixed by general trade
custom in regulating and supervising personnel in the
sale and distribution and use of explosives, and even,
whether failure to do so was negligence, were fact
.questions for the Jury."
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In the case of Burr vs. Sherwin-Williams Company, (Cal.
1953) 258 Pac. 2d 58, the theory of res ipsa loquitur was
applied. The Court stated:
~~The

manufacture of an article which is inherent
or imminently dangerous or which although not dangerous in itself becomes so when applied to its intended
use in the usual and customary manner is liable to
any third person whether the purchaser or a third
person who without fault on his part sustains an injury
which is the natural and proximate result of negligence
in the manufacture of the article, if the in jury might
have reasonably been anticipated."
In the powder explosion
to distinguish this from the
theory that the dynamite was
that it did exactly what it was

case, the defendant has tried
other explosions cited on the
manufactured to explode and
supposed to do.

However, it would seem that this could be no excuse or
reason for not applying the doctrine, or reason for the excusing
of a premature explosion as the powder is definitely dangerous
and therefore the manufacturer has that much higher degree
of responsibility placed upon him on it to see that the product
is manufactured and only explode under the conditions for
which it is manufactured and on no other occasion.
It would seem to the plaintiff that if there was any assumption of risk in an explosion, the assumption of risk would
be on the part of the manufacturer, as the manufacturer has
chosen to make his living in a business where there is some
danger and it should not be excused from its negligence just
because someone else had also ch?sen to work with powder.
27
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In research, counsel has been unable to find any place
or any case where the manufacturer or supplier has been
excused from negligence in the manufacture of any article,
no matter what its use was intended to be.
There is a growing need and tendency for the broader
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as shown in the
volume, ''Res Ipsa Loquitur-Presumptions and Burden of
Proof" b_y Mark Shain. Quoting from Page 260 it states:
']n these days of intensified and diversified industrialism and mechanics, the· presumption res ipsa loquitur, judiciously applied, is an invaluable medium
and means for the lessening of litigation, saving expense to litigants and reducing the duration of trials."
And from Page 261:
((Plain common sense tells us that risks and injuries
in every walk of life, which will concern all members
of society, except the one hundred per cent recluse or
hermit, must increase."
Also on page 263:
''When something breaks or explodes or seems to
go berserk, and injures, maims or kills a few or many
employees, patrons or others who are exposed to
danger without fault on their part, and who have no
possible means of either knowing or proving what
caused the calamity,-why should not that ownership
and management which assumed responsibility and
which, by every rule or reason, right, logic and equity,
must know or be able to ascertain the true cause, be
required to assume the burden of proof to explain
and exculpate itself for negligence?
Again, why should not the manufacturer or distributor of prepared foods or medicine which contain
28
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deliterious or poisonous substances-or manufacturer
of explosives-( the words ((or manufacturer of explosives" were inserted by counsel to point up the particular situation), or the person who permits a heavy
object to drop from his upper window on a passer by,
be required to establish, be a preponderance of the
evidence, his freedom from negligence?"
Mr. Shain further states on Page 275:
''It is arbitrary, provincial and archaic to cling to the
rule that the doctrine and principal of res ipsa loquitur
may be invoked in passenger-carrier cases, only, and
that, regardless of how completely the circumstances
of a falling object, or a master and servant case, or of
those involving food poisoning, defective machinery,
or any one of almost innumerable other situations
wherein state courts have found that the facts and
surrounding conditions showed a typical res ipsa case,
the eyes of the highest court in the land are closed and
its ears are deaf to the appeal of the injured party for
relief through that doctrine. To so hold in effect denies
to all classes except one a protection of the law accorded
to that one."
As there has not been a case decided by the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah on explosions, although the counsel is
advised there is a tire explosion case pending, it would seem
the application of the doctrine in this case could be very far
reaching it the court fails to apply the theory of res ipsa
loquitur. It would seem that all persons who went- injured by
explosions where there can be no direct evidence would be
precluded from all recovery. This would include any hunter
who has a shell explode in his hand while he was handling
it in an ordinary and normal fashion, any powder man who
is injured no matter how negligent the manufacturer was
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in the manufacture of the actual articles, and all the bottle
cases.
It would seem to counsel, as Mr. Shain points out, that
this would be an unnecessary restriction and would impede
progress and deny rights to parties injured.
The cases hold that it is not necessary to show by evidence
and preclude all possibility of an intervening cause, but only
that it is reasonably certain that there has been no tampering
or change of the instrumentality between the time of the possession of the defendant and the time of the accident.
It would seem clear that the fact that the defendant was
manufacturing dynamite and caps to be used by third persons,
knowing the very danger of the use, is rquired to use more
than ordinary care. to inspect all of the materials supplied
and to actually supply goods which are safe in every respect,
when used in the ordinary manner for the purpose for which
goods were manufactured. Here the evidence does show and
will show that the dynamite and cap was used in the regular
ordinary manner, in a manner known and approved by the
defendant, for the purpose for which it was manufactured.
In applying the doctrine as set forth in the latter cases
of res ipsa loquitur, it would seem clear:
1. That the plaintiff is entitled to have the evidence

heard as to all the circumstances and facts surrounding the
accident and submitted to the jury for its determination of
actual facts.
2. That the plaintiff, if he can reasonably prove that there

has been no change in the powder and dynamite in the instant
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case from the time that it left the factory until the time of
the explosion and that nothing that he has done contributed
or was the proximate cause of the accident, the plaintiff is
entitled to invoke the theory of res ipsa loquitur, and the jury
allowed to determine negligence.
3. That is from all the evidence there can be a number
of explanations even though based on inference and circumstantial evidence that the jury is entitled to consider all of
the possible explanations and determine which, if any, of the
possible explanations was the cause of the accident, and state
the ultimate liability.

CONCLUSION
The appellant respectfully represents to the Honorable
Court that the summary judgment of the lower court was given
in error and that the plaintiff should be allowed to place his
evidence before the jury and have the jury determine the facts
of the case and this Court should reverse and remand the case
for that purpose.
Respectfully submitted,
LOTHAIRE R. RICH
Attorney for Appellant
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